












































                                                 












The  massive  land  privatization  that  took  place  over  the  19th  century  deeply  transformed  the 
Spanish economic landscape. Nevertheless, the outcome of the process was quite different, both 
in  pace  and  impact,  depending  on  the  geographic  area  we  analyze.  The  explanation  for  this 
regional diversity in the persistence of common lands has been attributed to the institutional and 
environmental  context,  together  with  the  level  of  market  penetration  that  characterized  the 
different rural societies. However, the important role that the commons themselves played in this 








para  siempre  el  paisaje  económico  español.  Sin  embargo,  el  resultado  del  proceso  fue  muy 



























Many recent studies have demonstrated the importance of common lands in the 
reproduction and development of rural communities in the preindustrial economies, and 
their  capacity  for  adaptation  and  innovation
1.  The  commons  constituted  a  source, 
among other different goods and services, of pasture, wood, fertilizer and fuel, together 
with  the  possibility  of  temporary  cropping,  thus  playing  a  fundamental  role  in  the 
working of the rural communities. The common land was indeed a crucial element of a 
system in which agricultural activity was completely integrated with cattle breeding and 
forestry.  Moreover,  although  pre-industrial  societies  were  not  characterized  by  an 
equitable access to resources, the collectively-used land provided certain mechanisms 
of social cohesion that preserved the continuity of the system. In this sense, it was a 
way  of  guaranteeing  the  accumulation  process  of  the  upper  classes,  while 
simultaneously  allowing  the  less  favoured  sectors  of  the  population  to  obtain 
supplementary  rents  that  were  needed  for  their  own  reproduction.  In  a  rural  world 
whose productivity significantly depended on the use of the common lands, the welfare 
of these communities was thus influenced by their availability and by the way these 
collective resources were managed. 
However,  the  transformations  caused  by  the  transition  to  capitalism,  and  the 
emergence of a new liberal state, triggered the progressive dismantling of the common 
lands through the privatisation, not only of their property, but also of the use of these 
resources. The gradual establishment of a market economy in rural areas, the incentives 
generated by a greater demand for land and other raw materials, and the policies carried 
out by the liberal government, certainly contributed to drive the privatisation process. 
                                                             
1 See Vivier (1998), Moor, Shaw-Taylor and Warde (2002) and Allen (2004) for European examples and 
Moreno (1998), Iriarte (1998), De la Torre and Lana (2000) and Lana (2006, 2008) for Spanish examples. 4 
 
The massive privatisation developed throughout the 19
th century deeply transformed the 
Spanish  economic  landscape
2.  Nevertheless,  neither  the  pressures  created  by  the 
market,  nor  those  generated  by  the  state,  were  completely  successful,  and  thus  the 
outcome of the process was quite different, both in rhythm and impact, depending on 
the geographic area we analyse (map 1). The explanation for this regional diversity on 
the  persistence  of  common  lands  has  been  attributed  to  the  institutional  and 
environmental context, together with the level of market penetration that characterised 
the different rural societies (GEHR 1994; Balboa 1999; Iriarte 2002). However, the 
essential  role  that  the  commons  themselves  played  in  this  process  has  often  been 
overlooked. 
Map 1. Common land persistence in Spain, 1900 (% of total land) 
  
Source: Artiaga and Balboa (1992), GEHR (1994) and Gallego (2007); without the Basque Country. 
 
                                                             
2 The term economic landscape refers to the configuration of a certain productive area in relation to its 
edafoclimatic and orographic conditions, and the way in which society organizes the use of its natural 
resources, all of which determine its productive orientation and the sustainability of those practices.  5 
 
The aim of this paper is to complement those previous explanations by proposing 
a model that focuses on the collective land remaining, at any given moment, as a crucial 
explanatory variable and to provide an interpretative framework that would contribute 
to unveiling the complexity of a process that led to so many different situations
3. In this 
sense, the very availability of the commons constituted a key factor, in specific social 
and institutional contexts, in limiting their dismantling. It is also particularly stressed 
how the privatisation process reinforced itself, once it was put into motion, due to the 
lesser value that the remaining common lands had for the community. Therefore, the 
diversity of economic landscapes that emerged from the privatisation process can be 
endogenously  explained  by  the  conflicting  tension  between  centrifugal  forces 
promoting the privatisation of the common lands, and centripetal forces facilitating its 
persistence.  Although  the  process  reinforced  itself  once  initiated,  the  remaining 
common lands generated, in certain social and environmental contexts, the conditions 
and  incentives  that  allowed  local  communities  to  retain  a  greater  control  over  the 
property and management of this kind of resources, thus resisting the pressures that 
came from the market and the state.  
                                                             
3 Given the hybrid nature that characterized the concept of the “commons” in 19
th century Spain, this 
paper, following Iriarte (2002), identifies common lands as those lands that were collectively managed at 
the local level, in spite of their ownership being collective, municipal or public. See Beltrán (2010) for a 
discussion  of  this  assumption.  Although  the  dismantling  of  the  common  lands  also  implies  the 
privatisation of their uses (De la Torre and Lana 2000; Ortega Santos 2002), my aim is to focus on the 
redefinition of property rights. On the other hand, this process refers not only to the disentailment carried 
out from 1855 onwards, but also to other processes prior to, and after that date, such as sales made by the 
local institutions, usurpations and appropriations, arbitrary ploughings, etc. or distributions, since the end 
of the 18
th century (Balboa 1999, Jiménez Blanco 2002). 6 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section examines the 
economic,  social  and  environmental  functions  that  commons  fulfilled  and  how 
privatisation eroded them and made their subsequent dismantling even easier. Section 3 
presents data on the Spanish historical experience at the provincial level and lays out a 
theoretical  model  explaining  it  that  includes  the  common  lands  remaining  as  an 
explanatory variable. Finally, some concluding remarks are presented in section 4. 
 
2.  THE  RELEVANCE  OF  THE  COMMONS  TO  PROMOTE  OR  LIMIT 
PRIVATISATION 
The economic, social and environmental function that common lands provide is 
influenced,  among  other  elements,  by  the  acreage  that  rural  societies  had  at  their 
disposal. In this sense, the utility obtained from the commons is the best incentive that 
local  communities  had  to  protect  them  and,  therefore,  their  availability  becomes  a 
crucial factor in the analysis of their persistence. Nonetheless, changes in economic, 
institutional,  and  technological  conditions  could  trigger  the  privatisation  of  the 
collective  land,  a  process  that  would  be  more  or  less  intense  depending  on  the 
economic, social and environmental characteristics of the local communities (Iriarte 
2002). What is more interesting to emphasize now is that, together with the process of 
privatisation,  the  function  that  a  declining  commons  could  develop  would  decrease 
even more and, given the lesser interest that their protection would arouse, it would 
make their subsequent dismantling easier, in a self-reinforcing process. Therefore, the 
commons offered high-valued services to the community, but only if they maintained a 
critical volume. Once a certain threshold is passed, their value diminishes to a greater 
extent  and  as  a  result,  the  concern  for  their  defence.  In  fact,  the  reduction  in  the 
availability of collective lands promoted by privatisation not only reduced the utility 7 
 
that  they  could  provide  to  the  community,  but  also  had  collateral  effects  in  the 
economic,  social  and  environmental  variables  that  influenced  the  incentives  to 
privatise,  which  led  to  further  changes  in  the  nature  and  structure  of  the  rural 
communities. 
One of the first arguments subject to this circular and cumulative logic, which 
helps  to  explain  the  acceleration  of  the  privatisation  process,  and  stresses  the 
importance  of  the  availability  of  common  lands  in  order  to  explain  the  tempo  and 
intensity of their dismantling, is the extent to which capitalism has spread over the rural 
society. If the diffusion of market relations favours the privatisation of common lands 
(GEHR  1994;  Iriarte  2002),  their  dismantling,  in  turn,  made  the  penetration  of  the 
market logic easier in different ways. On the one hand, as well as the marketing of the 
land factor itself, the process forced peasants to resort to the market to acquire the 
products that they obtained directly from the commons hitherto and this, in turn, pushed 
them  to  sell  their  workforce  or  a  greater  part  of  their  productions  to  get  enough 
resources to participate in the market (GEHR 1999, 130-131). Similar consequences 
were derived from the privatisation of the use of those lands that remained public
4. 
According to Ortega (2002, 21), the growing predominance of market relations entailed 
a greater monetization of rural economies and the establishment of a wage relationship 
between individuals and nature. On the other hand, given the increasing role of the land 
                                                             
4 The transformation of collective uses into private ones would also contribute to the fact that the market 
directed  production  towards  the  most  valued  products  and  decided  who  the  beneficiary  was  through 
auction.  In  fact,  the  progress  of  privatised  uses  was  more  significant  in  those  provinces  where  the 
commons offered products highly valued by the market (GEHR 1999).    8 
 
as mortgage security, the market for credit would also enjoy a boost that, in turn, would 
accelerate the transmission of land (Iriarte and Lana 2007, 227)
5. 
Secondly,  the  commons  also  fulfilled  an  important  function  of  bringing  rural 
communities together and enhancing social cohesion within them. Many studies have 
emphasized that a greater identification among the members of the rural communities 
helps in generating enough general consent to protect common lands from privatisation 
(Iriarte 1998; Moreno 1998; Lana 2008). This social link would be stronger in areas 
with dispersed settlements, fewer social imbalances and a generalised collective use of 
the  common  lands.  Consequently,  it  would  contribute  to  increase  their  social 
functionality, thus increasing the incentives to protect an asset greatly valued by the 
community. Nevertheless, the communal regime would only deserve to be defended 
insofar as its size was important enough to guarantee that its services reached most 
groups within the community and, on the contrary, it would lose its capacity to carry 
out its functions as it was being privatised. In this sense, the privatisation process could 
threaten this social link through the growing social imbalances caused by the property 
concentration  that  sales  used  to  entail
6,  what  in  turn  put  more  pressure  over  the 
                                                             
5 See also Jiménez Blanco (2002, 146) for a review of the implication that the existence of common lands 
had in the markets of goods and productive factors. It is true, nonetheless, that in those areas where social 
links  were  stronger,  the  increasing  diffusion  of  market  relations  could  not  necessarily  imply  the 
privatisation of the common lands. On the contrary, the social cohesion and community relations that the 
commons and other mechanisms generated served as a complement to the market providing certain basic 
services, such as credit access and a kind of social security net (Gallego 2007; Lana 2008), that made the 
whole process more socially sustainable.  
6 In Extremadura, Castilla-La Mancha and Western Andalucía, the privatisation of common lands was 
one of the keys of the property accumulation carried out by the local privileged classes (GEHR 1994, 
120). Lana (2006, 19) indicates that more than 91 per cent of the surface area sold in Navarra from 1826 9 
 
commons (Esteve and Hernando 2007). In the same way, the deterioration of the social 
fabric became accentuated due to the productive reorientation caused by privatisation, 
which  usually  implied  the  consolidation  of  a  kind  of  extensive  exploitation  highly 
demanding on land but too scarce on workforce (Pérez Cebada 2007). The remaining 
common  lands  appear  again  as  a  relevant  element  to  explain  this  process.  Their 
dismantling  entailed  an  ownership  concentration  that,  together  with  the  erosion  of 
social cohesion mechanisms and the greater market dependence implied to those groups 
who lost the access to resources that used to be free, caused what has been called “the 
tragedy of the enclosures”
7. 
The  same  logic  applies  if  the  cohesive  role  attributed  to  collective  use  is 
analysed
8. The persistence of collective-use rights had a shock absorber effect over 
social imbalances or, at least, over their worst consequences, that allowed the peasants’ 
reproductive strategies a wider margin to manoeuvre and, consequently, influenced the 
general consent about the protection of the communal regime
9. In that case, the growth 
of privatised uses not only brought about the penetration of market relations in rural 
societies, but also increased inequality, by denying free access to communal resources. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
to 1860 ended up in the hands of well-off landowners, which gives an idea of how the privatisation 
process could increase the level of social imbalances, thus reducing the social cohesion needed for the 
defence of the commons.  
7 See Sala (1996) for a review of this view.  
8 According to Cabral (1995, 108) the privatisation of collective uses during the Ancient Regime in the 
province  of  Cádiz  ruined  the  rural  communities  and  accelerated  social  polarisation  and  rural 
proletarisation.  
9 Lana (2008, 178-180) states that collective-use rights not only persisted over the common lands still 
remaining, but also over certain privatised spaces, and both outcomes “tended to favour the community as 
a whole, suggesting that the intention was not to disrupt local balance”. 10 
 
From another point of view, Moor (2007, 138) argues that the reduction in the number 
of users accentuated the dissolution of the commons, since the relative proportion of 
individuals who really benefited from them had become too low to guarantee active 
support for the system
10. On the other hand, the collective use of the common lands 
favours local cooperation. The communal management of these resources contributes to 
the making of cooperation networks within the community and, consequently, helps to 
promote social cohesion (Iriarte 1998; Gallego 2007). In those areas where communal 
bonds  were  strong  enough  to  preserve  traditional  collective-use  rights,  these  same 
practices served to strengthen those ties, as well as to counterbalance the privatisation 
dynamic
11. 
In general, the level at which the interests of the ownership elite and most of the 
population for preservation of the commons coincided would therefore depend on the 
intensity of the links that hold the community together. These communal ties would 
limit the ability of the privileged classes to direct the process to their own benefit, 
including the wider interests of the local community in their decision-making. In fact, 
the outcome of this implicit negotiation would be influenced by the choices available to 
everyone  involved,  so  that  the  negotiation  process  was  more  or  less  balanced. 
According to Gallego (2007), the level to which privileged groups subordinated peasant 
                                                             
10 This argument reinforces the idea of the existence of a critical threshold, the number of users in this 
case, from which interest in the maintenance of the commons would decay and the privatisation process 
would be accelerated. 
11 The existence of these communal ties provided peasants with mechanisms different from the market, 
and also made the transition to a market economy more socially sustainable, an outcome completely 
different from what happened in other areas, especially in the south of Spain, where this social cohesion 
was lacking (Ortega 2002). 11 
 
exploitations to their own interests depended on the whole array of possibilities that 
peasant families could lean on. The availability and level of access to common lands 
was one of the primary assets that peasant families had, helping them to broaden their 
room  to  manoeuvre  in  the  negotiation  processes  with  local  elites
12.  Although 
arrangements  to  preserve  common  property  or  collective  use  were  part  of  a  wider 
agenda, the negotiation outcome would be partially influenced by the initial conditions 
in  relation  to  the  commons  remaining  and  the  way  their  access  was  allowed, 
determining thus the possibilities that less favoured groups had and their degree of 
freedom to negotiate. The privatisation process would weaken these social constructs 
and facilitate subsequent movements in this direction. 
On the other hand, the commons were a crucial element of the integrated and 
organic agriculture that characterized pre-industrial economies. Their role as provider 
of pasture and fertilizer contributed to improving agricultural productivity, resulting in 
a  greater  interest  in  their  preservation
13.  In  fact,  those  areas  where  this  integrated 
                                                             
12 Other elements that contributed to shaping the negotiation margin of peasant families were the level of 
access to other resources, such as land or credit, the possibility of obtaining an alternative income (wages, 
sales or remittances) and the cohesion of local and familiar networks (Gallego 2007, 165). In fact, the 
greater labour market dependence caused by the disappearance of collective-use rights left peasants in a 
more vulnerable position, since they lost their freedom of choice and were doomed to a compulsory 
submission to work conditions that benefited their employers (López Estudillo 1992, 93).  
13 As well as water, the other major limitation of Spanish agriculture was the structural lack of fertilizer 
and, therefore, the importance of the commons to the agricultural system is even more crucial (González 
de  Molina  2001,  55).  Their  function  of  improving  agricultural  yields  was  well-known  to  local 
communities. A municipality in La Rioja that was fighting against the privatisation of its common lands 
explained in a memo how peasants depended on those lands to feed their livestock, which was essential in 
turn  to  improve  agricultural  productivity  because  animals  provided  both  workforce  and  fertilizer. 12 
 
system yielded better results could meet the growing demand of agricultural products, 
increasing their output through intensification, rather than resorting to an extension of 
arable lands
14. On the contrary, those areas of the Iberian Peninsula with lower yields, 
because  of  a  substantial  water  shortage  or  the  presence  of  extreme  weather,  were 
compelled  to  plough  the  common  lands  to  increase  production.  In  this  sense,  the 
reduction of communal surface area triggered by the privatisation process limited its 
potential to supply fertilizer and to support livestock that provided more fertilizer and 
workforce.  Consequently,  it  reduced  agricultural  yields  even  more,  which  in  turn 
required even more arable land to face the increasing demand. 
Lastly, even though the social sustainability promoted by common lands might 
have more significance for their contemporaries (Moreno 1998), it is useful to stress the 
environmental  benefits  that  common  lands  provided:  limiting  deforestation, 
biodiversity  loses  and  soil  degradation,  resulting  from  the  extension  of  single-crop 
farming. According to Jiménez Blanco (2002, 168), the progressive privatisation of 
property, and of the management of common lands, meant a reduction of woodland and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Moreover, given the poor quality of their fields, the report stated that, if common lands, unfortunately, 
ended up being sold, the agricultural and livestock wealth would disappear (Gómez Urdáñez 2002, 158). 
14 See Beltrán (2010) for a discussion of this relationship. The persistence of common lands in humid 
Spain can be explained partly because of the greater capacity of its agriculture to improve its yields 
without resorting to land extension, and to the role that the common lands played in sustaining the growth 
of agricultural productivity. In certain environmental contexts, the availability of common lands became 
even more important, in that it improved the room to manoeuvre for peasant families, as previously 
analyzed. According to Gallego, the whole array of choices open to local communities that influenced 
their capacity to negotiate not only depended on the kind of rural society, but also on the potentialities and 
limitations imposed by environmental conditions (2007, 175). 13 
 
the  appearance  of  negative  externalities
15.  González  de  Molina  and  Martínez  Alier 
(2001, 11) do not indeed limit the concept of the “tragedy of the enclosures” to the 
social issues, but widen it to include the degradation of many communal resources
16. 
The degradation of the commons would diminish their capacity to fulfill the functions 
that the rural community demanded from them and, in doing so, it would reduce the 
incentives for their protection. In this sense, apart from the potential overexploitation 
that  their  privatisation  promoted,  Balboa  (1999,  119)  stresses  that  the  reduction  of 
                                                             
15 Among the externalities that Jiménez Blanco (2002, 168) discusses, there were erosive phenomena, 
floods, the silting up of wetlands, alteration of water flows, etc. The author contends that these problems 
became  serious  -  even  irreversible  -  in  fragile  ecosystems  such  as  southeast  Spain.  In  a  study  of 
communal practices in Flanders, De Moors (2007, 137) shows that, in opposition to the practices carried 
out by the users of the commons, who perfectly understood the dangers of demographic growth and the 
marketing of communal resources, and made an effort to reach an ecological optimum, their privatisation 
led  to  a  less  ecologically-balanced  system.  The  Spanish  experience  leads  to  similar  conclusions  and 
underlines  the  fact  that  rural  communities  administered  their  resources  effectively,  far  from  the 
exploitative behaviour that is usually attributed to them (González de Molina et al 2002, 507). 
16 These authors interpret the expropriation of common assets as a globally negative process for the 
peasant economies, for their standard of living, and for the preservation of forestry ecosystems (González 
de Molina and Ortega 2000, 97). In a different work, Ortega (2001, 387) similarly argues that the changes 
in the use of the commons caused by their privatisation entailed the socio-environmental disarticulation of 
the  communal  regime.  In  a  study  of  what  happened  in  the  Granada  county  of  Baza,  Ortega  (2002) 
establishes that the privatisation of the commons, not only of their ownership, but also of the collective 
uses of the land that remained public, transformed the relation between man and nature, causing the 
expansion of forestry monocultures, the increase of extractive effort, and the putting of most of these 
spaces under the plough. On the other hand, the peasant protests defending common assets in the 19
th and 
20
th centuries, without using an explicitly ecological language, has been identified as an environmental 
conflict,  since  it  called  into  question  the  sustainability  of  the  management  of  these  resources  (Soto 
Fernández et al 2007, 281). 14 
 
collective resources would facilitate their degradation. A reduced availability of these 
resources would put more pressure on them
17 and, at the same time, a greater insecurity 
about their use would lead peasants to prioritize survival over resource preservation, 
resorting in addition to expressions of protest that could imply aggressions to common 
lands
18.    
 
3.  AN  INTERPRETATIVE  PROPOSAL  AROUND  THE  REMAINING 
COMMONS 
The  arguments  developed  above  about  the  value  that  the  common  property 
regime represented for local communities highlight the incentives that these societies 
had to defend a key resource in terms of their welfare. This view also points to the 
circular  and  cumulative  negative  effects  on  the  persistence  of  collectively-managed 
resources derived from the privatisation process, a process that would reinforce itself 
once it reached a critical threshold. The extent of common lands still remaining would, 
therefore,  be  a  mixed  factor;  acting  in  favour  of  communal  persistence  when  their 
amount was great enough, while facilitating privatisation as it adopted smaller values as 
privatisation  was  carried  out,  a  trend  that  became  self-sustaining  once  it  reached  a 
certain critical size. Thus, an important availability of collective resources, given the 
value  they  provided  to  the  rural  society,  would  maintain  a  high  interest  in  their 
protection, especially in certain social and environmental contexts. On the contrary, the 
less communal surface area, the less value to the community and, consequently, the 
                                                             
17 In a well-known study on the eastern Netherlands, Van Zanden also finds that “the enclosure of the 
pastures  resulted  in  pressure  on  the  remaining  commons  becoming  even  greater”  what  lead  to 
overexploitation and “the emergence of sand drifts” (1999, 134). 
18 These aggressions ranged from increasing illegal uses to intentional fires. 15 
 
fewer incentives to protect it, which would accelerate its dissolution. Furthermore, their 
reduction  in  size  would  undermine  the  social  and  environmental  balances  that  the 
commons sustained, reinforcing the negative effects in the same direction.  
The Spanish historical experience supports this interpretation. Although we do 
not have data on the availability of commons at the beginning of the process (the end of 
the 18
th century), a close analysis of the different cases generated between 1850 and 
1900 allows for interesting conclusions (figure 1)
19. Firstly, focusing on the upper-right 
square, it is shown that, with the peculiar exception of Zaragoza, there are no situations 
in which high percentages of common lands at the beginning of the process implied 
important privatisations, a point that supports the thesis defended in this paper
20. The 
upper-left square shows those provinces that enjoyed significant amounts of collective 
resources in 1859 and, interestingly, were largely still public in 1926
21. These areas 
certainly shared social and environmental features that facilitated the persistence of 
common lands. In contrast, those provinces that began with lower amounts of public 
                                                             
19  See  Beltrán  (2010)  for  a  discussion  about  the  different  social  and  environmental  conditions  that 
characterize the diverse areas portrayed in the graph and their influence on communal persistence. 
20 In the atypical case of the Ebro valley, the privatisation process did not really begin until the last third 
of the 19
th century, following the new economic conjuncture in the wine, wheat and sugar beet markets 
(GEHR 1994, 122). 
21 The scarce evidence available at the district or local level also points to the idea that common lands still 
remaining were a crucial factor in explaining the diverse privatisation process even in the interior of a 
province. The data offered by Iriarte (1998) for the case of Navarra shows how those areas that enjoyed a 
greater percentage of common property in 1861 suffered a much less significant loss between 1861 and 
1898. There is also evidence from the province of Lérida that supports the idea that those areas where 
common  land  survival  in  the  19
th  century  was  greater  were  those  where  these  kinds  of  resources 
continued to be of major importance at the beginning of the process (Bonales 1999). 16 
 
lands show much more diverse privatisation results. The different outcomes can be 
explained by analysing the timing of the process, as well as the different economic, 
social and environmental context of each area. 
 
Source: Artiaga and Balboa (1992), GEHR (1994) and Gallego (2007)
22. 
 
In  the  first  place,  the  lower-right  square  shows  those  provinces  where  the 
privatisation process was really ahead during the period prior to 1859, and where land 
sales continued at a high rate during the second half of the 19
th century. In these areas, 
less favourable social and environmental circumstances led to a major dismantling of 
collective  lands  during  the  whole  period,  based  on  the  circular  and  cumulative 
processes  presented  in  this  paper.  Alternatively,  the  lower-left  square  reflects  those 
situations where the privatisation process was relatively ahead around 1850, but made 
little progress thereafter. This can be explained by the saturation effect caused by the 
                                                             
22 The thicker lines that draw the four different squares in the figure reflect the country average of the 
variables in play. 17 
 
privatisation dynamic in those areas where potentially productive plots of land had 
already become private. Once past a critical threshold, the self-reinforcing privatisation 
process would diminish before common goods disappeared, since the remaining lands 
would increasingly be of worse quality. Supporting this idea, it is worth noting that the 
provinces that appear in this square combine a steep orography and/or extreme weather, 
implying that, given the significant advance of privatisation, the scarce common lands 
remaining in 1859 did not offer sufficient incentive to potential buyers. Discussing the 
dismantling  of  the  common  lands  in  Navarra,  De  la  Torre  and  Lana  confirm  its 
exhaustion,  attributing  it  to  the  meagre  attractiveness  that  the  assets  subject  to 
expropriation  could  offer  as  an  investment,  due  to  their  intrinsic  characteristics  as 
remnants (2000, 82)
23. Figure 2 stresses both the acceleration and the slowing down of 
the privatisation process in Navarra, the only province from which we have detailed 
data on the timing of the process throughout the 19
th century
24. Therefore, although the 
common lands remaining played an important role in explaining their own persistence, 
their  significance  is  diluted  as  they  are  dismantled,  not  only  because  their  gradual 
disappearance made the privatisation process self-reinforcing, but also because of the 
increasing scarcity of incentives offered by the stunted land remaining.  
 
                                                             
23 The GEHR (1994, 117) also refers to the limited productive potential of the remaining public lands at 
the end of the process in most of the southern half of Spain, where the frequency of sales was especially 
intense.  
24 The disturbing data of the 1808/14 interval is caused by an extremely convulsed period in political 
terms. See Lana (2006) for a comprehensive analysis of the situation.  18 
 
 
Source: De la Torre y Lana (2000)
25. 
 
Following the ideas proposed by Krugman (1991), the privatisation of common 
lands  may  be  considered  as  a  path-dependent  phenomenon,  in  which  the  relative 
tension between centrifugal and centripetal forces would endogenously lead to multiple 
economic landscapes. The diverse geography that emerged from this process depended 
significantly  on  initial  conditions  involving  not  only  the  economic,  social  and 
environmental  variables,  but  also  the  actual  availability  of  the  common  lands.  
Furthermore, slight changes in the parameters of the factors that influence the process, 
or in the availability of the commons through the privatisation dynamic, may have 
deeper effects in the persistence of common lands due to processes of circular and 
cumulative causation. In this sense, when any of the variables, especially the collective 
lands themselves, reach a critical threshold, the process becomes self-reinforcing. Thus, 
the differing tempo and intensity of the privatisation process would be caused by the 
                                                             
25 Corralizas and sotos refer to different kinds of collective properties. See Lana (2006) for a detailed 
description. 19 
 
interaction between centrifugal and centripetal forces, with some of these pushing to 
dismantling  the  commons,  while  others  acting  in  favour  of  their  preservation.  The 
market  incentives  and  the  pressures  enacted  by  the  liberal  State  would  be 
counterbalanced,  especially  in  certain  contexts,  by  the  social  and  environmental 
conditions  that  characterized  local  communities.  On  the  other  hand,  the  commons 
would play a major role in explaining their own greater or lesser persistence. First of 
all, common lands limited the privatisation process since, given their crucial role in the 
functioning  of  the  rural  communities,  they  generated  incentives  for  preservation, 
particularly in the areas just mentioned. Secondly, once their dismantling was put into 
motion and the common lands remaining reached a certain critical size, the process 
became self-reinforcing due to the lesser value that a declining resource could generate. 
Lastly, once the privatisation was relatively developed, the limited attraction of the 
common  lands  remaining  would  diminish  the  incentives,  and  thus  sales  would  be 
greatly reduced. 
The logistic distribution (figure 3) employed to describe growth processes that 
experience saturation states would be adequate to analyse the phenomenon described. 
The different variables would combine the economic and political factors that foster 
privatisation, together with the social and environmental conditions that characterized 
the diverse areas of the Spanish geography and that could, in certain contexts, set a 
limit  to  the  process.  The  volume  of  the  collectively-managed  lands  still  remaining 
through time becomes a key variable that contributes to explaining the trajectory of 





Generally  speaking,  the  model  proposed  would  depart  from  a  theoretical 
equilibrium,  found  in  organic-based  agrarian  societies  where  the  communal  regime 
constituted  a  central  element,  from  which  there  would  be  no  incentives  for  its 
dismantling
26. The pressures arising from an expansive market and the financial needs 
                                                             
26 In theory, although this “idyllic” situation would extend back in time in an almost horizontal line, this 
theoretical  situation  does  not  actually  exist.  In  fact,  the  history  of  the  dismantling  of  the  European 
commons  could  be  traced  to  the  Middle  Ages  (GEHR  1994).  The  demographic  pressure  and  the 
increasing  predominance  of  market  mechanisms  were  undermining  the  role  common  lands  played  in 
diverse contexts. Although the initial situation, connected to the different evolution every rural society 
underwent, would not thus be the same in each case; what is stressed here is that the starting point would 
greatly influence the process. Data scarcity, however, prevents us from being more precise when it comes 
to quantifying the commons available in the different areas at the beginning of the 19
th century. Yet when 
data is available, the relatively high communal persistence at the end of the Ancient Regime in Cádiz, 
Badajoz and Cáceres (42.1, 33.1 and 42.2 percentages of the total provincial land respectively), which 
were regions that suffered an intense privatization during the 19
th century, is in line with the model 21 
 
of municipalities, together with the priority that the liberal state gave to privatisation, 
promoted the dismantling of the collective lands from the end of the 18
th century
27. 
However, the tempo and intensity of privatisation was determined by the social and 
environmental characteristics of the societies and the amount of common lands still 
remaining. In those places where the privatisation process reduced the commons to a 
certain critical size, the process accelerated, becoming self-reinforcing. Once most of 
the sales were carried out, the lack of appeal of the surviving lands would decrease the 
impetus of the process
28. The model that would be obtained should not be lineal, since 
historical evolution - complex, diverse and changing - could introduce changes in its 
parameters, both gradual and discontinuous, moving the function in one direction or 
another, or even serving to modify its slope.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
outlined and gives support to this interpretation (Cabral 1995, 124; Linares 2004, 22). From a different 
perspective and according to Lana (2008, 165), in pre-industrial economies, the communal regime would 
have followed “an equilibrium path” achieving, at the same time, an efficient use of the resources and the 
reproduction of society, with its inherent inequalities. In fact, “the diversity of contexts and points of 
equilibrium would help to explain the variety of access and management modes of the common resources 
that are historically found” (165).  
27 Lana (2008, 165) argues that, from the second half of the 18th century, the equilibrium mentioned 
before would break apart following the path that the new economic and political situation created, since it 
caused a shift in the class interests in favour of the dismantling of the collective lands.  
28 Although the quantitative importance of the privatisation during the first half of this century remains 
unclear, research at the provincial level reveals that they were at least as important as the ones carried out 
under the Disentailment Law of 1855 and that they slowed down from 1873 onwards (Cabral 1995; Lana 
2006). The ending point to which, at its most, the process tends in the Spanish case would correspond to 
the percentage of commons considered to be of “public utility” in 1901. This concept defines those lands 
that, given the benefits they provided to the environment, would be especially protected by the State and 




This interpretation gives a major importance to path-dependency, since concrete 
institutional designs are the result of social interaction in the long run. The consensus 
over the commons depends on the function that these lands play in the society where 
they exists; a function that is influenced by the social and environmental context and by 
the availability of collective lands, and that is ultimately going to be modified by the 
outcome of the privatisation process. Reinforced by a continuous interaction over the 
centuries, the initial conditions of the rural societies that were being formed in the 
different Spanish regions would have allowed the development of a kind of institutions 
that  made  the  persistence  and  adaptation  of  the  commons  more  or  less  difficult
29. 
Summing up the outline presented in this paper, the mutual interaction between social 
and environmental factors was reinforced, once the privatisation process was set in 
motion, as a result of the gradual establishment of a market economy supported by the 
liberal State. The dismantling of the commons was initially easier in certain areas, a 
process that would become self-sustaining due to the lesser value - economic, social 
and  environmental  -  that  the  still  surviving  collective  lands  could  offer.  Therefore, 
starting  from  a  hypothetical  situation  typical  of  pre-industrial  societies,  where  the 
common lands available to the rural communities constituted an important, but variable, 
percentage of the territory, the different areas would diverge in as many potential paths 
                                                             
29  Balboa  (1999,  107)  stresses  the  importance  of  past  epochs’  inheritance  to  explain  the  historical 
evolution and the diversity of situations and outcomes of the privatisation process in Spain. In this sense, 
the initial legal conditions were not the same in different areas; the collective entitlement to the land being 
predominant in northwest Spain, as opposed to the state or municipal entitlement present in most of the 
rest of the country (Jiménez Blanco 2002, 151).  23 
 
as  there  were  provinces,  or  even  counties
30,  depending  on  their  social  and 
environmental conditions. Applying Krugman’s terminology, the Spanish rural areas 
witnessed  the  transformation  of  their  own  economic  landscape,  from  a  relatively 
symmetric  equilibrium  where  common  lands  enjoyed  a  major  significance  in  each 
region, to a system where multiple equilibriums coexisted, depending on the persistence 
of the communal regime in each situation. 
The model suggested could be able to reflect the whole array of cases occurring 
in  the  Spanish  commons  throughout  the  19
th  century.  In  general,  the  collectively-
managed  lands  only  persisted  under  certain  social  and  environmental  conditions, 
capable of partially offsetting the pressures coming from the market and the State. In 
other regions, more adverse conditions led to high privatisation levels
31. In these places, 
the risk of reducing the volume of the common lands below their critical level, and thus 
making the process self-reinforcing, was greater, and especially so in those areas that 
had  more  unfavourable  circumstances.  Likewise,  the  historical  dynamic  would 
introduce  unsettling  effects  that  may  have  caused  movements  in  the  communal 
persistence function
32. In this sense, the role played by the liberal State to shape the 
process  was  by  no  means  uniform.  The  turbulent  first  half  of  the  19
th  century,  for 
                                                             
30  It  is  important  to  acknowledge  that  the  outcome  of  the  privatization  process  may  also  present 
remarkable differences within the same province (Balboa 1999, 113). 
31 The northwest of Spain preserved a large part of their common lands, while the southern half of the 
Peninsula  suffered  an  intense  privatisation.  The  rest  of  the  country  would  occupy  an  intermediate 
position, with diverse exceptions and gradations between them. See GEHR (1994), Iriarte (2002) and 
Beltrán  (2010)  for  a  review  of  the  specific  social  and  environmental  conditions  that  influenced  the 
persistence of common lands. 
32 See Balboa (1999), Jiménez Blanco (2002) and Iriarte (2002) for a detailed summary of what took 
place during this period. 24 
 
instance,  characterized  by  continuous  conflicts  and  their  negative  effects  over  the 
municipal  treasury,  led  to  an  increase  of  the  privatisation  incentives,  since  local 
authorities saw the potential privatisation as a solution to their financial troubles
33. The 
public intervention that fostered the sale of common lands through the Madoz Law 
(1855)  constituted  another  inflection  point  in  the  disentailment  trajectory
34.  On  the 
other hand, the whole period witnessed a growing market penetration and, therefore, the 
relative tension between centrifugal and centripetal forces was gradually undermined
35. 
Market incentives were indeed higher from the second half of the century, which would 
                                                             
33 In an exhaustive analysis of the sales carried out in Navarra in the first half of the 19
th century, Lana 
(2006) wonders if the municipal financial troubles might have been an excuse for the local elites to 
appropriate the collective resources. The political instability also favoured illegal appropriations of these 
lands (Iriarte 2002, 22). On the contrary, once this turbulent time was over, municipalities might have 
realized that preserving the commons was a convenient strategy because they represented an important 
asset that could be used as a source of income or as a source of valuable services to the community 
(Moreno 1998, 98). 
34 This law theoretically forced local communities to sell all land that was considered as “propios”, so to 
say, those common lands that were enjoyed privately after paying a rent to the municipalities (Iriarte and 
Lana 2006, 695). However, the law’s application was by no means homogenous, nor lineal. Lana (2006), 
for instance, affirms that, during the four years previous to the application of the General Disentailment 
Law, Navarran municipalities embarked on a rush to privatisation, to avoid sharing the revenues with the 
central State, which would cause a major displacement in the communal persistence function. On the 
other hand, the State’s actions could not only drive the process, but also slow it down through the active 
protection of “some environmentally sensitive uplands” (Iriarte 2002, 23). 
35 According to Lana, “the gradual enlargement of markets for agricultural products and the permeation 
into society of an utilitarian individualism […] were the driving forces behind the transformation of land 
into a commodity” (2006, 27). 25 
 
imply a stronger pressure on the commons
36. Each of these developments could, in 
certain areas, have reduced the availability of common lands, thus crossing the critical 
threshold by which the value these resources offered to the local community declined to 
a  greater  extent.  Consequently,  the  process  became  self-reinforcing,  with  fatal 
consequences for their persistence
37.  
Although a model as described might miss the richness of detail inherent in such 
a complex phenomenon, it could perhaps serve as a template for future research to test 
its validity in the multiple circumstances that shaped the historical trajectory of the 
common lands. Likewise, the availability of more complete data about the forces that 
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